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INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

TALKING POINTS

DOS, OSD Reviews  
Completed.

8/16/71 meeting  
with Sub Group  
- Paris  
Security for  
General Security

Introduction

-- It is good to see you again. I have a few matters, some of which are technical, that I wish to discuss with you for transmittal to Peking.

Negotiations with the Soviet Union

- Prime Minister Chou En-lai will recall our discussions on this subject.
- In the last few weeks we have made good progress in two negotiations:
  - . Measures to lessen the chance of accidental nuclear war, which is a rather technical area that has been discussed in the SALT talks.
  - . Berlin, which involves the British and French as well as the Russians.

Accidental War

- The main provisions of the agreement which we are close to concluding with the Russians are as follows:
  - . Each side will improve its organizational and technical arrangements to guard against the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons under its control.

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- The parties will notify each other immediately in the event of an accidental or unauthorized incident involving possible detonation of a nuclear weapon which could risk the outbreak of nuclear war. [The party whose nuclear weapon is involved will seek to neutralize it without its causing damage.]
  - The parties will notify each other immediately in the event of detecting unidentified objects [or interference with warning systems] if such occurrences could create the risk of nuclear war between the two countries; and each party will notify the other in advance of any missile launches which will extend beyond its national territory in the direction of the other party.
  - Each party in other situations involving unexplained nuclear incidents will act so as to lessen the chance of misinterpretation by the other party.
- These are the principal provisions (full text at Tab A).
- For the information of the PRC, and as I told the Prime Minister, we have been scrupulous in keeping out of this agreement any phrases that refer to third countries. Specifically:
- we have rejected the idea of an accession clause or any reference to third country accession; and
  - we changed language which the other side proposed that would have suggested reporting to each other on the nuclear activities of third countries.

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-- We have taken these positions because we do not wish to have it appear that we and the Russians are making joint moves with respect to others. We believe the agreement as now drafted will in fact reduce the risks of accidental nuclear war and is carefully phrased so that it cannot be construed as being directed against third countries.

*Resisting public declaration  
We will not make any* As I made clear in Peking, we are prepared to sign the same type of agreement with the PRC if it is interested.

Berlin

-- (Give rundown of these negotiations.)

#### Meeting with Soviet Leaders

- When I was in Peking I explained the prospects for a meeting between the President and Soviet leaders.
- Assuming we reach final agreement in the accidental war and Berlin areas in the near future, we shall move to make a public announcement about a Presidential visit to the Soviet Union. Such an announcement could come as early as within a few weeks, but as we have made clear consistently, the meeting itself would take place after the President's visit to China.
- We will continue to keep the PRC informed of any developments on this subject, and specifically, will give you advance warning of the public announcement.

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-- Naturally, the President when he is in Peking, and I during my advance visit, will be prepared to discuss fully all issues relating to a possible meeting with the Soviet leaders.

Visitors to the U.S.

- Several months ago, prior to my visit to Peking, we extended an invitation to Prime Minister Gandhi of India to visit the United States. This invitation is still outstanding, but if she accepts, the visit will take place around November 9, 1971.
- The President has agreed to meet briefly with the Emperor of Japan when he stops over in Anchorage, Alaska on September 27<sup>th</sup> on his way to Europe. This was preferred to a more extensive official visit. This meeting is still closely held, but we expect that it will be announced later this week.

South Asia

- As I said in my communication to you last week, we thought it would be useful to explain how we see the situation in the South Asian subcontinent and how we are approaching it.
- First of all, as I emphasized to the Prime Minister, we are making it emphatically clear to the parties concerned that we are strongly opposed to military actions. We are using our influence with both sides to keep hostilities from breaking out.

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-- In addition to our close ties with Pakistan, we still retain some influence with India, a country which has received more economic aid from us than any other.

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- In this volatile situation, we believe it is important for us to try and maintain communications and influence with both sides.
- We would be interested in the Chinese views on this situation and, if they care to comment, on the implications of the Soviet-Indian Treaty of Friendship.

The President's Trip to Peking

- We would like to set a date for the President's visit, and would welcome the views of the PRC on this matter.
- The most convenient time from our standpoint would be for the President to arrive in Peking on February 21, 1972. Our second preference would be March 15, 1972.
- We believe that the visit should be up to seven days.

Kissinger Trip to Peking

- The PRC has suggested the latter part of October. I would like to go to Peking as close to October 15 as is convenient for the PRC, because President Tito of Yugoslavia is visiting the U.S. on October 28. We would appreciate your Government's views.
- I am planning to stop overnight in Hawaii and come to China via Guam. I will be using a Presidential airplane which I assume will be going on to Peking after first landing in Shanghai (presumably to take on a Chinese navigator).

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-- I think that we would need perhaps up to four days to continue our policy discussions and prepare for the subsequent visit by the President.

PRC Public Statements

-- We have been carefully restraining official speculation and substantive comment on the forthcoming Presidential visit to Peking.

-- We have understood the reasons for some Chinese commentaries, but we believe that now we have passed through the initial period, it would be helpful if such commentaries could subside somewhat.

-- We think this would be in our mutual interest. To take just one example, we shall, of course, stick to the understandings on the Taiwan Independence Movement that I outlined to the Prime Minister. But if too much attention is focussed on this question, it could develop into a major public issue when it need not be one.

Ambassador Huang Hua

-- I have a brief note to Ambassador Huang Hua welcoming him to the North American Continent which I would appreciate your forwarding to him. My letter to him is merely a courtesy and indicates how I could be reached if necessary (Tab B).

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- You, of course, will remain the sole official channel to your Government, and that is why I am sending this letter through you.
- In case of unforeseen circumstances requiring emergency communication, it might be useful for the PRC to designate someone we could contact quickly in case we could not get through to you right away.
- Because of his proximity, Ambassador Huang Hua seemed a logical choice, but we will of course abide by the preference of the PRC on this matter.

Lend Lease

- While in Peking I promised to provide the Prime Minister with the amount of our Lend Lease aid during the 1940's. We have checked the figures - our assistance totaled \$48.4 billion through March 31, 1948 when the program ended. (About 1/4 of this went to the Soviet Union.)
- I would appreciate your forwarding this information to the Prime Minister.

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SECRET

August 11, 1971

For Mr. Kissinger


The Soviets raised accession clause last April, and were told not to make a formal proposal. They have not returned to it. If they do our delegation is instructed to reject it (Tab B).

Full text as now agreed (Tab A).

Original proposition from the Soviets was as follows:

"Each Party undertakes to act in all other situations involving nuclear weapons in such a manner as to reduce the possibility of its actions being misinterpreted by the other side. Each Party may inform the other side or request information when, in its view, this is warranted by the interests of averting the risk of outbreak of nuclear war."

More relevant to China problem is Soviet proposal of July 1970 for agreement for joint action against third countries in case of "provocative attack." We rejected this completely.



AGREE No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/22 : LOC-HAK-460-8-12-9 : NUCLEAR  
WAR BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET  
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST  
REPUBLICS, HEREINAFTER REFERRED TO AS THE PARTIES:

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE DEVASTATING CONSEQUENCES THAT NUCLEAR  
WAR WOULD HAVE FOR ALL MANKIND, AND RECOGNIZING THE NEED TO  
EXERT EVERY EFFORT TO AVERT THE RISK OF OUTBREAK OF SUCH A WAR,  
INCLUDING MEASURES TO GUARD AGAINST ACCIDENTAL OR UNAUTHORIZED USE  
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS,

BELIEVING THAT AGREEMENT ON MEASURES FOR REDUCING THE RISK OF  
OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR SERVES THE INTERESTS OF STRENGTHENING  
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY, AND IS IN NO WAY CONTRARY TO THE  
INTERESTS OF ANY OTHER COUNTRY,

BEARING IN MIND THAT CONTINUED EFFORTS ARE ALSO NEEDED IN THE  
FUTURE TO SEEK WAYS OF REDUCING THE RISK OF OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR  
WAR,

HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

#### ARTICLE 1

EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES TO MAINTAIN, AND TO IMPROVE AS IT DEEMS  
NECESSARY, ITS EXISTING ORGANIZATIONAL AND TECHNICAL ARRANGEMENTS  
TO GUARD AGAINST THE ACCIDENTAL OR UNAUTHORIZED USE OF NUCLEAR  
WEAPONS UNDER ITS CONTROL.

#### ARTICLE 2

THE PARTIES UNDERTAKE TO NOTIFY EACH OTHER IMMEDIATELY IN THE  
EVENT OF AN ACCIDENTAL, UNAUTHORIZED OR ANY OTHER UNEXPLAINED  
INCIDENT INVOLVING POSSIBLE DETONATION OF A NUCLEAR WEAPON  
WHICH COULD CREATE A RISK OF OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR. IN THE EVENT  
OF SUCH AN INCIDENT, THE PARTY WHOSE NUCLEAR WEAPON IS INVOLVED  
WILL IMMEDIATELY MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO TAKE NECESSARY MEASURES TO  
RENDER HARMLESS OR DESTROY SUCH WEAPON WITHOUT ITS CAUSING DAMAGE.

#### ARTICLE 3

THE PARTIES UNDERTAKE TO NOTIFY EACH OTHER IMMEDIATELY IN THE  
EVENT OF DETECTION BY MISSILE WARNING SYSTEMS OF UNIDENTIFIED  
OBJECTS, OR IN THE EVENT OF SIGNS OF INTERFERENCE WITH THESE  
SYSTEMS OR WITH RELATED COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES, IF SUCH OCCUR-  
RENCES COULD CREATE A RISK OF OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR BETWEEN THE TWO  
COUNTRIES.

#### ARTICLE 4

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SECRET

THESE IF EVER LAUNCHED WILL  
BE IN THE HANDS OF THE PROTECTION OF THE

THE PARTIES TO THE PRESENT DISCUSSIONS INVOLVING UNEXPLAINED NUCLEAR INCIDENTS SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO ACT IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO REDUCE THE RISK OF A NUCLEAR WAR. SUCH A MANNER SHOULD BE INTERPRETED BY THE OTHER PARTY. THE OTHER PARTY MAY INFORM THE OTHER PARTY OR REQUEST INFORMATION WHEN, IN ITS VIEW, THIS IS WARRANTED BY THE INTERESTS OF AVERTING THE RISK OF OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR.

## ARTICLE 6

FOR TRANSMISSION OF URGENT INFORMATION, NOTIFICATIONS AND REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION IN SITUATIONS REQUIRING PROMPT CLARIFICATION, THE PARTIES SHALL MAKE PRIMARY USE OF THE DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS LINK BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS.

FOR TRANSMISSION OF OTHER INFORMATION, NOTIFICATIONS AND REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION, THE PARTIES, AT THEIR OWN DISCRETION, MAY USE ANY COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES, INCLUDING DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS, DEPENDING ON THE DEGREE OF URGENCY.

## ARTICLE 7

THE PARTIES UNDERTAKE TO HOLD CONSULTATIONS, AS MUTUALLY AGREED, TO CONSIDER QUESTIONS RELATING TO IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT, AS WELL AS TO DISCUSS POSSIBLE AMENDMENTS THERETO AIMED AT FURTHER IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PURPOSES OF THIS AGREEMENT.

## ARTICLE 8

THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE OF UNLIMITED DURATION.

## ARTICLE 9

THIS AGREEMENT SHALL ENTER INTO FORCE UPON SIGNATURE.

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TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 03 SALT V 00885 02 OF 02 041741Z

DONE AT-----ON -----, ----- 1971, IN TWO COPIES, EACH IN THE  
ENGLISH AND RUSSIAN LANGUAGES, BOTH TEXTS BEING EQUALLY  
AUTHENTIC.

AUGUST 4, 1971

GP-3SMITH

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TELEGRAM

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DRAFTED BY: ACDA/IR:DAARON

APPROVED BY: ACDA/AD - PHILIP J. FARLEY

ACDAYST - MR. KEENEY

JCS - COL. VON INS

OSC - MR. HOUD

STATE - MR. MARTIN

25X1

WH - MR. SONNENFELDT

S/S - MR. CURRAN

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TO USDEL SALT V

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EXDIS SALT

SUBJECT: THIRD COUNTRY ACCESSION TO AGREEMENT ON ACCIDENTS  
MEASURES

REF: SALT 211

1. IF SOVIETS AGAIN RAISE QUESTION OF THIRD COUNTRY ACCESSION, DELEGATION SHOULD TAKE POSITION THAT ACCIDENT MEASURES AGREEMENT SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT CONTAIN ACCESSION CLAUSE NOR ANY REFERENCE TO THIRD COUNTRY ACCESSION. IN THIS CONNECTION YOU SHOULD AS NECESSARY INFORM SOVIETS THAT WHILE WE RECOGNIZE SOVIET POINT THAT THIS GENERAL SUBJECT MAY BE OF POSSIBLE INTEREST TO OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT JOINT DECLARATION OR PARALLEL STATEMENTS OF OUR WILLINGNESS TO ENTER INTO SUCH NEGOTIATIONS IS DESIRABLE.

2. IN EXPLAINING OUR POSITION, YOU MAY STATE THAT

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TELEGRAM

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A CLAUSE FOR ACCESSION OF THIRD COUNTRIES TO AN AGREEMENT REACHED IN SALT WOULD NOT, IN OUR VIEW, BE A DESIRABLE PRECEDENT FOR OUR BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS. SIMILARLY, WE BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE TO USE SALT AS FORUM FOR WHAT, IN EFFECT, WOULD BE JOINT OR PARALLEL PROPOSALS TO OTHER COUNTRIES. WE WOULD, OF COURSE, BE PREPARED TO CONSULT FURTHER WITH THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS SHOW INTEREST IN PURSUING THIS SUBJECT ON A MULTILATERAL BASIS.

3. FYI. AS FAR AS PUBLIC COMMENTS ON THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH ARRANGEMENTS WITH OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS IS CONCERNED, WE HAVE IN MIND NOT TAKING THE INITIATIVE BUT RATHER RESPONDING AS WE CONSIDER NECESSARY. END FYI.

GP-1 ROGERS

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B



8/16/71

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

Welcome to the North American continent. It is clear from news reports that you have already received warm greetings in your new post, and I would like to add my own.

I will always retain vivid memories of my forty-nine hours in Peking and the graceful hospitality with which my colleagues and I were received.

Please feel free to call upon me whenever you believe I can be of assistance, whether it be to clarify events or provide you with government publications (unclassified, of course!).

I thought it might be useful for you to have my telephone numbers at which you could reach me quickly if some urgent matter required it. The White House switchboard always knows my whereabouts and its number is Area Code 202, 456-1414; my direct office number is 456-2235. Alternatively, you could also contact Winston Lord of my staff whom you met in Peking, either via the White House switchboard or at his home,

STAT

Best regards,

— — —  
Henry A. Kissinger

His Excellency  
The Honorable Huang Hua  
The Ambassador of the People's Republic of China  
Ottawa

*Handed by HAK 8/16/71 to Ambassador*

*Huang Chen in Paris for transmittal  
to Huang Hua*